I costi di transazione (CT) possono essere definiti come i costi sostenuti per realizzare uno scambio, un contratto o una transazione economica in genere, ovvero derivanti dal loro trasferimento da un agente economico ad un altro. Nell’ambito di strumenti politici come le misure agroambientali-climatiche - MABC (pratiche agricole rispettose dell'ambiente e di misure di conservazione attuate nel paesaggio agricolo) i CT possono essere visti come un meccanismo contrattuale per la transazione di beni e servizi ambientali tra agenti economici rappresentati dagli agricoltori (che rappresentano i venditori) e le autorità pubbliche (che rappresentano gli acquirenti).
È importante che gli agenti economici identifichino quali sono i CT più importanti (es. Costi di ricerca, costi di negoziazione, costi di monitoraggio), chi li sostiene e come variano fra le diverse tipologie di misure.
Nel progetto Contracts 2.0 il ruolo dei CT nelle MABC sarà analizzato attraverso una metodologia qualitativa con interviste semi-strutturate con informatori chiave (key informants) e agricoltori appartenenti ai diversi Contracts Innovation Labs e Policy Innovation Labs coinvolti nel progetto. 
Il risultato atteso di questa analisi è quello di individuare i CT più significativi percepiti dagli agenti economici, valutando le attività legate a ciascuna categoria di CT individuando al tempo stesso quali siano le più limitanti, dispendiose in termini di tempo e costo. Inoltre, l'analisi avrà anche lo scopo di scoprire le determinanti dei CT individuati.
L’analisi dei CT è essenziale per determinare se le MABC attuali sono efficienti/efficaci (dal punto di vista dei costi) in modo da incoraggiare gli agricoltori a parteciparvi.

Un parque agrario es un concepto innovador que pretende proteger y valorizar las tierras agrícolas productivas para la producción de alimentos y por el valor cultural y recreativo que proporciona a los residentes de la región. El concepto también pretende contribuir a la reformulación (y revalorización) de la agricultura en un entorno periurbano, donde esta actividad ofrece muchas ventajas (productos frescos, espacios verdes, puestos de trabajo, etc.) debido a su proximidad a los centros urbanos. Al mismo tiempo, esta proximidad a zonas urbanas e industriales en crecimiento supone la amenaza de que estas zonas agrícolas periurbanas tradicionales se fragmenten y retrocedan con la consiguiente pérdida de productividad y transformación del paisaje. 
El Parque Agrario de Fuenlabrada es un buen ejemplo que pone en práctica esta figura. Está situado en el sur de Madrid y cuenta con 800 hectáreas de terreno agrícola. Su desarrollo responde al interés de las instituciones locales por mantener y potenciar la producción agrícola local, así como por recuperar y conservar el paisaje periurbano existente en torno a la ciudad de Fuenlabrada. Un enfoque participativo garantiza que se tengan en cuenta las necesidades de los principales actores, tanto los agricultores como los residentes de la región. El parque agrícola está mejorando el potencial económico, medioambiental y sociocultural del territorio y sus actores desde un punto de vista multifuncional y agroecológico. Los principales problemas de Fuenlabrada están relacionados con el abandono de las explotaciones por jubilación, la falta de relevo generacional y la amenaza de la expansión urbana e industrial. Para más información: https://parqueagrariofuenlabrada.es

Based on two workshops with participants from more than 10 European countries, including practitioners and academics, barriers and bottlenecks for starting or expanding collective contracts for agri-environmental management were identified. Commonly cited barriers centre around issues with administration, policies and lack of trust. Existing policies and regulation are not set up to accommodate or encourage collective contracts. This is linked to rigid administrative structures and the perceived additional bureaucracy associated with collective contract. There is a lack of incentives for administrations to share power and control with other actors, coupled with a lack of trust and experience, and a top down mindset. Land tenure pattern may also create barriers, in particular where subsidies go to the owner and not the tenant. Barriers at the farmer level include not knowing the interests of neighbouring farmers, different opinions about the appropriate management, lack of trust between farmers, an unwillingness to give up control to the collective, and many farmers distrusting nature associations. Where farmers join only for financial motives, 'freeriders' may become a problem, eroding the reciprocal basis of collectives. The increasing use of farming contractors further inhibits collective approaches. Lack of experience, habits and inertia lead to path dependency. Additional social barriers emerge where generational conflicts or cultural differences exist, or where 'newcomers' to an area are not integrated. Organisational costs, higher costs for coordination and overheads, coupled with limited funding, are bottlenecks identified for expanding the work of collectives. More information: katrin.prager@abdn.ac.uk

Collective approaches to agri-environmental management are increasingly important. They include both, the collective contracts and collaboration that occurs as part of designing, administering and managing different agri-environmental contracts. The Pyrenees in France and Northwest England share many characteristics, with land use dominated by pastoral/ grazing systems (sheep, cattle), low population density and high-value landscapes. Challenges include diverse grazing patterns, land abandonment vs overgrazing, generational changes, farming profitability and development pressures. Key to understanding the collective arrangements is the recognition of both formal contracting and informal traditional practices of collaboration. In both cases, the principle of (individual) agri-environmental contracts has been extended to cover areas of collectively managed land. The contracts available to collective managers through AES require substantial input: 1) from them to recruit participants/ farmers/ shepherds and coordinate new practices; 2) from facilitators to negotiate shared objectives between stakeholders. However, these transaction costs are poorly recognised and compensated under current contracting arrangements. The flexibility required in grazing management and existing informal arrangements is incompatible with rigid administrative requirements. Management rights are complicated by other layers of authority and ownership. These interrelated institutional, economic and socio-cultural factors will also play a role in the delivery of environmental public goods in other contexts; they need to be taken into account to achieve intended outcomes. More information: katrin.prager@abdn.ac.uk

To tackle the complex challenges of agriculture, nature and the environment more effectively, several studies advocate a shift from an individual farm approach towards a collective approach using a landscape scale as a reference. In this Practice Abstract we synthetise some recommendations for policy-makers on how to foster these collaborative initiatives, based on successful examples in Europe. 

There are several examples in Europe of farmers working together on the delivery of public goods related to nature and environment. Many of them are local initiatives, rather limited in scope. In those regions where the number and extent of groups is higher (e.g. NL, UK, FR), the influence of an appropriate policymaking has been noticed. In general these groups consist of (i) local initiatives that have been (ii) stimulated and supported by policy, (iii) with the assistance of an intermediary partner (facilitator/coordinator/advisor). 

A stimulating policy framework therefore focus on two aspects: 
(i) fostering farmers' bottom-up interest in cooperation, by creating incentives for cooperation (via increased level of payments (e.g. group bonus), flexibility, access to funds and/or assistance, etc.) and removing administrative barriers (e.g. allowing groups of farmers to be beneficiaries of subsidies) and 
(ii) providing (support for the) assistance for the groups of farmers: technical, organisational and/or administrative guidance for groups (both in formation and operation).

A selection of farmers participating in the UK’s Pilot Results-Based Scheme in Grassland Habitats were interviewed regarding their perceptions towards this innovative approach. Based on their responses, some key recommendations in scheme administration were identified for policymakers to consider.
Bureaucracy: Some of the most frequently mentioned issues with existing schemes relate to paperwork. The forms, rules and administration processes were considered far too complex. This acts as a significant barrier to scheme uptake. In contrast, the paperwork associated with their pilot results-based contract was much simpler to understand and manage. A results-based approach could reduce barriers which deter farmers fromjoining environmental schemes.
Advice: Consistent support and training from locally based officers was vital in farmer engagement with the results-based scheme and its success. National rollouts of similar schemes must strive to reach farmers through well-established networks and provide reliable support and training through approachable local officers.
Measuring success: Scheme policymakers should explore carefully the most effective and fair way to measure and reward good results. Assessment of habitat indicators should be flexible. It should consider issues outside of farmers’ control, such as extreme weather. Otherwise, the perceived vulnerability to such factors and associated risk may be a barrier to results-based scheme uptake. Scoring systems should also be flexible to accommodate proxy habitat features which provide similar benefits. 
The incorporation of results-based approaches has much potential for future agri-environment schemes if thoughtfully and effectively executed in policy.

In results-based agri-environmental contracts, payment to the farmer is based on achieving specific environmental results, rather than paying for ‘prescribed’ management practices which aim to achieve those results, as in most existing action-based schemes. An appropriate set of indicators is needed to assess this achievement.
This practice abstract introduces and defines direct & proxy indicators, the two main categories which are used to distinguish types of indicator in results-based approaches. Both direct & proxy indicators have advantages and disadvantages which are important to consider when developing a scheme.
Direct indicators, as the name suggests, measure the quality or occurrence of the specific environmental feature which is being targeted by the agri-environment contract. For example, a direct indicator for a biodiversity scheme aiming to protect bird species would be assessed through the counting and examination, or ‘abundance’, of the target species. 
Proxy indicators indirectly measure the targeted environmental objective, using measures that have a reliable underlying relationship to the targeted environmental feature. For example, a proxy indicator for a biodiversity scheme aiming to protect bird species might be assessed through the quality of the habitat provided which is suitable for the target species. 
See Practice Abstract No.12 for more information about a method for selecting either direct or proxy indicators.

In results-based agri-environmental contracts, payment to the farmer is based on achieving specific environmental results. For fair payment, it is crucial that results are assessed using the most suitable indicators. Indicators can be composed of direct or proxy measures (see PA No.13 for the differences between these indicator types).
A possible method to select indicators is a Multi Criteria Analysis (MCA). In an MCA, different criteria are used to rank indicator sets. Criteria within an MCA have different dimensions: information on costs for monitoring, ecological representativeness, or social acceptance of indicators etc. can be used for the ranking. Criteria may differ in weight: costs may be considered less important than social acceptance, but these weights also differ among stakeholders: farmers may consider ecological representativeness less important than social acceptance, but non-governmental organizations may find the opposite.
A study in Münsterland, Germany, compared the direct indicator ‘abundance per species’ and the proxy indicator ‘habitat quality’ for four farm bird species. Literature shows that ‘habitat quality’ can be described by ‘vegetation height’, ‘vegetation coverage’, ‘wet features’, ‘management’ and ‘other features’. Fifteen environmental, social and economic criteria were selected to rank the direct and proxy indicator for each bird species with an MCA. Bird experts scored the direct and proxy indicator on the environmental and economic criteria and other stakeholders (e.g. farmers, NGOs, government agencies) scored the indicators on the social criteria. All stakeholders assigned weights to each criterion. The MCA showed that the direct indicator ranked highest for most bird species.

Die Zusammenarbeit von Landwirten und anderen regionalen Akteuren bei der Umsetzung von Naturschutzmaßnahmen kann die ökologischen Auswirkungen der Maßnahmen verbessern. Bisher gibt es nur wenige Erkenntnisse über die Motivation der Landwirte bei kooperativen Ansätzen, während für eine individuelle Umsetzung bekannt ist, dass die Teilnahmebereitschaft an Umweltprogrammen durch eine Reihe von kontextspezifischen, agronomischen, kulturellen, sozialen und psychologischen Faktoren beeinflusst wird.

In Contracts2.0 konzentrieren wir uns auf die Faktoren, die die Motivation im Rahmen von kooperativen Agrarumweltprogrammen beeinflussen. Diese Erkenntnisse können dazu beitragen, Strategien für kooperative Initiativen zu entwickeln, um das Engagement der Landwirte zu verbessern. 

Vorläufige Ergebnisse einer Literaturrecherche und eigene Felddaten aus einer Umfrage und einem Workshop mit Mitgleidern einer niederländischen Kollektive bestätigen, dass eine Kombination verschiedener Faktoren die Motivationen prägt. Zu den wichtigen Faktoren gehören das Umweltbewusstsein der Landwirte und ihre Verantwortung für den Landschaftsschutz, die eine ebenso wichtige Rolle spielen wie die Zahlungsmodalitäten. Soziale Faktoren wie genossenschaftliche Traditionen und Gruppendruck spielen mit zunehmender Erfahrung und Alter der Gemeinschaftsinitiativen eine immer größere Rolle. Zu den diskutierten Strategien zur Förderung der Motivation gehörten die Verbesserung der Kommunikation zwischen den Landwirten, ein angemessener Rahmen und die Vertrauensbildung durch die Moderatoren sowie wirtschaftliche Anreize wie die Bonuszahlung eines niederländischen Vertriebsunternehmens, das Landwirte unterstützt, die sich an dem Kooperationsprogramm beteiligen.

Complementing the practice abstract on "Barriers to collective contracts in agri-environmental management", this practice abstract highlights some streategies to overcome such barriers and bottlenecks. Existing collective contracts have a diverse institutional set up, and their context and specific arrangements vary widely between countries and regions. Their success depends on a supportive policy context, available resources and continuously addressing institutional challenges. Many small steps will be required to change a top down institutional culture. Communication and coordination are key to lay the foundation and develop effective collective contracts. Building trust is crucial for collective contracts: amongst farmers, between farmers and nature associations, and with policy makers. Intermediaries can play a very important role in this, as shown in examples from Belgium, Netherlands and the UK in Contracts2.0 case studies. Contract governance has to be transparent, integrative and flexible. It is beneficial if contracts are guided by an agreed framework of priorities and target, such as a provincial Nature Conservation Plan (NL) or regional Area Plan (UK). Ideally, entrepreneurship of land managers and farmers should be strengthened. Payments from collective contracts need to go to the land manager, not the land owner. Government support can help overcome barriers to farmer cooperation, e.g. by compensating for organisational costs and facilitation, providing advisory services targeting collectives and training. Monetary incentives for farmers can be an initial motivation, but social capital is extended in the process of a collective working together. More information: katrin.prager@abdn.ac.uk

Folgende Maßnahmen können eine Ausbreitung unerwünschter Kräutern minimieren.

Auswahl des Standortes: Blühstreifen nicht auf vorbelastenen Flächen anlegen.

Auswahl des Saatguts: Grundsätzlich sollte die Saatgutmischung an den jeweiligen Standort angepasst sein. Mischungen mit vielen verschiedenen Arten kommen am besten mit unterschiedlichen Standort- und Witterungsbedingungen zurecht. Wann immer möglich, sollte auf zertifiziertes Regio-Saatgut zurückgegriffen werden.

Aussaat: Bei mehrjährigem Wildpflanzensaatgut sollte die Aussaat bevorzugt im Herbst erfolgen. Das Saatbett sollte wie zur Getreideeinsaat feinkrümelig vorbereitet werden. Bei pfluglosen Verfahren müssen die Pflanzenreste gut in den Boden eingearbeitet werden. Das Saatgut sollte gut durchmischt und flach ausgesät werden. Ein anschließendes Anwalzen ist wichtig, um einen guten Bodenschluss zu erreichen.

Entwicklungspflege: Einige Kräuter entwickeln sich langsam und sind dadurch konkurrenzschwächer. Sollten unerwünschte Arten schneller auflaufen und die Entwicklung des Blühstreifens negativ beeinflussen, wird ein Schröpfschnitt einige Wochen nach der Aussaat empfohlen. Dieser sollte bei Bedarf wiederholt werden. Die Schnitthöhe sollte so gewählt werden, dass die Problempflanzen entfernt aber die eingesäten Jungpflanzen gleichzeitig nicht geschädigt werden.

Folgepflege: Wenn Problempflanzen auftreten, müssen diese rechtzeitig vor der Blüte bzw. Samenreife entfernt werden. Soweit möglich sollte dies selektiv erfolgen und das Mahdgut abgeräumt werden. Sofern eine Neuanlage des Blühstreifens notwendig ist, sollte dies abschnittsweise erfolgen, um einen Rückzugsraum für Wildtiere zu erhalten.

Za oceno uspešnosti in učinkovitosti kmetijsko-okoljskih ciljev v EU se je vzpostavil Skupni okvir za ocenjevanje in vrednotenje SKP (CMEF). CMEF vključuje seznam kazalnikov uspešnosti (KU) in njihove hierarhične strukture. Pregledovanje okvira CMEF in z njim povezane pravne podlage nam je razkril neskladne prevode vrst kategorij KU in njihovih odnosov iz angleščine v slovenščino. Uredbe v slovenskih različicah uporabljajo različne izraze za iste vrste kategorij KU. To zmoti hierarhične ravni kategorij KU, kar ustvarja dvoumnost v obveznostih poročanja za Slovenijo in lahko povzroča težave pri ocenjevanju uspešnosti SKP s KU v praksi. 

Zato predlagamo uskladitev pravnega prevoda kategorij KU v:
1. izraz „output indicators“ se prevede v „kazalniki učinka“,
2. izraz „result indicators“ se prevede v „kazalniki rezultatov“,
3. izraz „impact indicators“ se prevede v „kazalniki vpliva“ in
4. izraz „context indicators“ se prevede v „kazalniki stanja“.

Ta usklajeni prevod kategorij KU bi moral biti skladno uporabljen v Okviru za spremljanje in ocenjevanje uspešnosti (PMEF), naslednikom CMEF. Naša analiza kaže, da se je pojavila nedoslednost pri prevajanju, ker pravni prevajalci niso preverili semantičnih razlik v prevodih kategorij KU med nanašajočimi se uredbami in so uporabili napačne pomenke. Tovrstnim netočnostim bi se lahko izognili z vzpostavitvijo notranjih pravnih slovarjev in z boljšim usklajevanjem pravnih prevajalskih storitev, ki bi se prepričale, da je prevod določenih izrazov skladen v vseh povezanih pravnih dokumentih.

Creating and implementing agri-environmental-climate contracts is a challenging political process, shaped by several actors and diverse in-terests (e.g. different economical, ecological and social perspectives, small-scale and large-scale farmers, extensive and intensive produc-tion). Analyzing this process and its outcomes (i.e. policies, measures and contracts) helps to understand the current situation and design bet-ter contracts. However, it is equally important to engage policy makers and other stakeholders in a process of joint thinking, because such a collaboration can more effectively identify challenges of, and innovative solutions for agri-environmental and climate contracts and can also facil-itate their successful implementation at wider scales.
Several tools and techniques are available to initiate collaboration be-tween policy makers and other stakeholders. Selecting the most suitable tools depend on: a) which question we want to answer; b) how much time we have; c) how big the group is; d) how well participants know each other, and e) how strong our facilitation skills are. 

Main question to answer--> Some suggested tools
-What are challenges, key intervention points? --> Intervention Logic, Five Whys, Evaluation Diagram 
-How do contracts fit into the policy mix? --> Screening the policy mix, Co-creation workshop, etc. 
-How can contracts be better implemented? --> Policy Canvas, Empathy Building, Rapid Prototyping

More background and practical factsheets of proposed tools are available in the Contracts2.0 Deliverable D4.1.

I costi di transazione (CT) possono essere definiti come i costi sostenuti per realizzare uno scambio, un contratto o una transazione economica in genere, ovvero derivanti dal loro trasferimento da un agente economico ad un altro. Nell’ambito di strumenti politici come le misure agroambientali-climatiche - MABC (pratiche agricole rispettose dell'ambiente e di misure di conservazione attuate nel paesaggio agricolo) i CT possono essere visti come un meccanismo contrattuale per la transazione di beni e servizi ambientali tra agenti economici rappresentati dagli agricoltori (che rappresentano i venditori) e le autorità pubbliche (che rappresentano gli acquirenti).
È importante che gli agenti economici identifichino quali sono i CT più importanti (es. Costi di ricerca, costi di negoziazione, costi di monitoraggio), chi li sostiene e come variano fra le diverse tipologie di misure.
Nel progetto Contracts 2.0 il ruolo dei CT nelle MABC sarà analizzato attraverso una metodologia qualitativa con interviste semi-strutturate con informatori chiave (key informants) e agricoltori appartenenti ai diversi Contracts Innovation Labs e Policy Innovation Labs coinvolti nel progetto. 
Il risultato atteso di questa analisi è quello di individuare i CT più significativi percepiti dagli agenti economici, valutando le attività legate a ciascuna categoria di CT individuando al tempo stesso quali siano le più limitanti, dispendiose in termini di tempo e costo. Inoltre, l'analisi avrà anche lo scopo di scoprire le determinanti dei CT individuati.
L’analisi dei CT è essenziale per determinare se le MABC attuali sono efficienti/efficaci (dal punto di vista dei costi) in modo da incoraggiare gli agricoltori a parteciparvi.

Produktkennzeichnungen werden verwendet, um die Verbraucher über die verschiedenen Aspekte der Lebensmittelproduktion, -verarbeitung und -verteilung zu informieren, damit sie eine bewusste Lebensmittelauswahl treffen können, die ihren Werten und Vorlieben entspricht. Bislang wurde noch nicht untersucht, wie Labels genutzt werden können, um die Bereitstellung von Ökosystemleistungen entlang der Wertschöpfungskette zu fördern, indem die Verbraucher über umweltfreundlichere landwirtschaftliche Produktionsverfahren informiert werden.
Die Q-Methodik ist ein leistungsfähiger interviewbasierter Ansatz, der quantitative und qualitative Elemente kombiniert, um die Subjektivität von Werten und Präferenzen aufzudecken. Sie wird angewandt, um die Wahrnehmungen der verschiedenen Interessengruppen zu ermitteln, die in die Gestaltung von Labels einfließen können. Im Rahmen des Projekts Contracts2.0 werden in Deutschland, Spanien und Polen Q-Interviews mit Lebensmittelherstellern, Einzelhändlern und Bio-Lebensmittelverbänden durchgeführt, um deren Expertenwissen zu gewinnen. Die Sondierungsgespräche bilden die Grundlage für eine größere und landesweite Verbraucherbefragung, mit der die Präferenzen der Verbraucher für die Gestaltung des Labels auf breiter Basis ermittelt werden sollen. 
Q-Interviews werden üblicherweise von Angesicht zu Angesicht und persönlich durchgeführt. Aufgrund von COVID-19-bedingten Sitzungsbeschränkungen mussten wir jedoch zu Telefoninterviews übergehen und den Teilnehmern die erforderlichen Materialien im Voraus zusenden, was bisher recht gut funktioniert hat!